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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 12-2046 & 12-2236 
________________ 
 
 
D & D ASSOCIATES, INC. 
a New Jersey Corporation 
 
Appellant (12-2046) 
 
v. 
 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF NORTH PLAINFIELD; THE VITETTA GROUP, INC., 
n/k/a/ Vitetta; BOVIS LEND LEASE INC; ROBERT C. EPSTEIN 
 
Robert C. Epstein, 
Appellant (12-2236) 
 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-03-cv-01026) 
District Judge: Honorable Mary L. Cooper 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 19, 2013 
 
Before: AMBRO, and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 and O’CONNOR,* Associate Justice (Ret.) 
 
(Opinion filed: January 8, 2014) 
                                              
*
 Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice (Ret.) for the Supreme Court of the 
United States, sitting by designation. 
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________________ 
 
OPINION  
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Plaintiff D&D Associates, Inc. (“D&D”), a New Jersey contractor, entered into a 
variety of contracts for school renovation with defendant North Plainfield Board of 
Education (the “Board”). After relations soured, D&D sued the Board and the Board’s 
attorney, Roger Epstein (“Epstein”), as well as the construction management company 
and architect the Board hired. D&D’s claims covered a variety of contractual, tort, and 
civil rights claims. The District Court dismissed all counts of the complaint or granted 
summary judgment in favor of defendants. D&D appeals as to some counts of the 
complaint; Epstein cross-appeals as to two. On all issues properly before us, we affirm 
the District Court. 
I. Background 
 In 2001, the Board awarded construction contracts to D&D for the renovation and 
expansion of five schools. To fulfill its contractual bonding requirements, D&D obtained 
bonds from American Motorists Insurance Company (“the Surety”). The Surety and 
D&D entered into a General Indemnity Agreement (“GIA”). It contained a provision 
stating that, in the event of a default, D&D would “assign, transfer, and set over to 
Surety, all of their rights under all Bonded Contract(s), including . . . all claims and 
causes of actions against any parties to the Bonded Contract[.]” The Board entered into 
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contracts for the project with an architecture firm, Vitteta Group, Inc. (“Vittetta”), and a 
construction management firm, Bovis Lend Lease, Inc. (“Bovis”). 
 Relations among the parties quickly broke down and, after repeatedly informing 
D&D of issues relating to the construction, Epstein, on behalf of the Board, sent the 
Surety a letter stating that D&D was in default in February 2002, but withdrew the notice 
a month later. Despite the withdrawal, between March and July 2003 the Board, after 
providing notice, terminated D&D from all contracts and demanded that the Surety fulfill 
the contractor’s remaining obligations. The Board and the Surety entered into takeover 
agreements to facilitate the completion of all responsibilities. 
 During this time, the Surety began to decline D&D’s requests for further large-
scale bonding. From 2000 to 2003, D&D applied for prequalification, a New Jersey 
classification allowing a contractor to bid on school facilities projects. This application 
was approved each year until 2003, when D&D submitted an incomplete application that 
was deemed withdrawn. D&D asserts that because it had lost bonding capacity, it would 
not have been eligible for prequalification even with a complete application. It filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in August 2003, and its reorganization plan was approved in 
January 2005.  
 In March 2003, D&D filed its initial complaint in this action, charging the Board, 
Vitteta, Bovis, and Epstein with a variety of civil rights and tort claims. An amended 
complaint added additional claims. Between 2003 and 2012, the case went through 
extensive litigation at the District Court. This culminated in a March 2012 opinion that 
granted summary judgment for the Board on all remaining counts and for Epstein on 
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Count Two (stigma-plus reputational harm). The same order denied both Epstein’s 
motion for summary judgment on Count Ten (tortious interference) and Count Eleven 
(defamation) and D&D’s motion for summary judgment on various counts. Having 
disposed of all federal law claims, the District Court declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over Counts Ten and Eleven, both state law claims, and dismissed those 
counts against Epstein, Bovis, and Vitteta without prejudice. D&D appeals the grants of 
summary judgment in favor of the Board on several counts and in favor of Epstein on 
Count Two. Epstein cross-appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment on 
Counts Ten and Eleven.  
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over D&D’s federal law claims under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over D&D’s state law claims under 28 
U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review 
summary judgment orders de novo, applying the same test as the district court, which 
states that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law and there is no genuine dispute of material fact.” Hampton v. 
Borough of Tinton Falls Police Dep’t, 98 F.3d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1996). Where we have 
jurisdiction to do so, we exercise plenary review over a denial of a motion for summary 
judgment. See Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1251 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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III. Analysis 
A. Count One: Property Seizure 
 In the first count of the amended complaint, D&D argues it was denied due 
process through the unlawful seizure of its property. The District Court granted summary 
judgment for both the Board and Epstein on this count in 2007. Although portions of 
D&D’s opening brief appear to relate to this count, it has not been properly preserved on 
appeal.  
 D&D’s opening brief does not request that this count be reinstated or at any point 
identify Count One specifically as being erroneously dismissed. Where the brief to us 
refers to property seizure, those arguments are entangled with contentions on other 
counts. In addition, the citation seemingly intended to indicate the property-seizure claim 
in the statement of issues corresponds to a section of the District Court’s 2007 opinion 
concerning other claims, not Count One, meaning that the portion of the judgment 
appealed from is never identified. D&D’s vague efforts are insufficient to place the issue 
before us, and we make no decision on the merits of this claim.  
B. Count Two: Stigma Plus 
 The second count of the amended complaint charges various defendants of making 
false statements that deprived D&D of its liberty interest in prequalification. The 
contractor argues that the District Court erred in dismissing this count against the Board 
and not reinstating this count against Epstein.
1
 
                                              
1
 In a previous order, the District Court granted summary judgment for Epstein on Count 
Two. 
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 Civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on reputational harms are known 
as “stigma-plus” claims. See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 
2006). In order to make out such a claim, “a plaintiff must show a stigma to his 
reputation plus deprivation of some additional right or interest.” Id. (emphasis in 
original). In other words, reputation damage is not actionable unless “it occurs in the 
course of or is accompanied by a change or extinguishment of a right or status guaranteed 
by state law or the Constitution.” Clark v. Twp. of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 
1989). While stigma-plus analysis is most common in public employment cases, see, e.g., 
Ersek v. Twp. of Springfield, 102 F.3d 79 (3d Cir. 1996), it can also be used in other 
contexts, see Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 208-10 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 To establish stigma, the relevant statements by the defendant must be both made 
publicly and false. Hill, 455 F.3d at 236. Here, D&D asserts that the Board and Epstein 
falsely claimed it was in default when no formal default proceedings had occurred. 
Because of the disagreement among the parties as to whether D&D was actually in 
default, the District Court correctly concluded that “there is at least a factual dispute 
between the parties” over whether the relevant statements were false. This dispute is 
sufficient for D&D to avoid summary judgment on the stigma prong of its stigma-plus 
claim. 
 The second, or “plus,” requirement refers to the additional deprivation needed to 
transform a stigmatizing statement into a § 1983 claim. D&D suggests that the loss of its 
status as a prequalified contractor satisfies this requirement. The District Court concluded 
that prequalification is not an interest protected by due process, a conclusion that is at 
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least somewhat in tension with precedent. See Berlanti v. Bodman, 780 F.2d 296, 300 (3d 
Cir. 1985) (noting that New Jersey recognizes “a property interest in not being arbitrarily 
debarred” from public contracts that triggers “some procedural protection under the due 
process clause”).  
 We need not determine whether a protected interest in prequalification exists 
because the connection between the alleged stigma and the loss of prequalification is too 
remote for stigma-plus liability against either the Board or Epstein. By D&D’s own 
argument, the alleged reputational attacks affected prequalification only indirectly, by 
causing the Surety to decline further bonding. Even if those indirect effects were 
sufficient, the Surety’s decisions were attributable to other factors, including liens from 
D&D’s subcontractors, the size of D&D’s assets, and concerns about D&D’s ability to 
handle existing projects. 
 Moreover, in 2003, the only year D&D applied for and did not receive 
prequalification, its application was missing necessary signatures, notarizations, 
affidavits, and financial records. It did not respond to requests to cure these deficiencies 
and, as a result, the application was deemed withdrawn. D&D has not applied for 
prequalification since 2003. The contractor’s own actions in failing to apply properly for 
prequalification therefore intervened between the actions of the defendants and 
prequalification not being renewed. Such an attenuated connection is too strained to 
support a stigma-plus claim. See WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 80 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 
1996) (“[T]he ‘stigma-plus’ test requires that the defamation be accompanied by an 
injury directly caused by the Government, rather than an injury caused by the act of some 
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third party.”). Hence the loss of prequalification here is insufficient to raise a genuine 
question of material fact regarding the stigma-plus claim, and the District Court did not 
err in granting summary judgment on this count.  
C. Counts Three & Four: First Amendment Retaliation 
 D&D argues the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for the Board 
on the contractor’s § 1983 claims of retaliation for exercising its First Amendment rights. 
The amended complaint includes two such claims: Count Three charges that the 
defendants issued default letters in retaliation for D&D’s response to delays in the project 
schedule; Count Four alleges that D&D’s contracts with the Board were terminated in 
retaliation for this lawsuit.
2
 
 To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must 
prove ‘(1) that he engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the government 
responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity caused the retaliation.’” 
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Eichenlaub v. Twp. of 
Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004)). Where the speaker is a government 
employee, that person “must show that he or she spoke as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern.” Borough of Duryea, Pa., v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2493 (2011) (emphasis 
added). This test, “adjusted to weigh the government’s interests as contractor rather than 
                                              
2
 In its appellate brief, D&D alleges the Board suppressed a newspaper article and 
retaliated against D&D for “protesting the Board’s unlawful attempt to proceed without 
building permits.” Because these arguments were apparently not raised before the District 
Court, they are waived and not before us. See United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 212 
(3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that arguments asserted for the first time on appeal are 
deemed to be waived and consequently are not susceptible to review in this Court absent 
exceptional circumstances.”).  
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as employer,” applies to government contractors like D&D. Board of Cnty. Comm’rs v. 
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 673 (1996).  
 Count Three fails on the first prong because the speech in question was in D&D’s 
capacity as a contractor, not a citizen, and therefore not constitutionally protected. D&D 
claims it was retaliated against for refusing to “make false statements for public 
distribution that the Projects were on schedule” and for actually making “statements that 
defendants themselves had caused delays; for D&D’s requests for extensions of time and 
other compensation; and for D&D’s attempt to meet with other prime contractors affected 
by defendant’s improper actions to form a coordinated attempt to seek scheduling 
adjustments and other redresses.” The District Court concluded that this speech was on a 
matter of public concern, but was made (or not made) in D&D’s employee capacity and 
not protected by the First Amendment. On appeal, D&D does not challenge the 
conclusion that the relevant speech was in its capacity as an employee. Because there is 
no underlying constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary to reach the other steps. 
Therefore, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment for the Board on 
Count Three. 
 Count Four, charging that the Board retaliated against D&D for initiating this 
litigation, has not been properly preserved for appeal. As discussed above with regard to 
Count One, appellants are deemed to have abandoned a claim on appeal unless, in their 
opening brief, they identify that claim in the statement of issues and present arguments in 
support of their position on that claim. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 
1993) (“[C]asual mention of an issue in a brief is cursory treatment insufficient to 
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preserve the issue on appeal.”). Here, D&D requested in its conclusion that this count be 
reinstated against the Board but made no arguments regarding retaliation for initiating 
litigation anywhere in the brief. Nor, for that matter, did D&D specifically refer to 
retaliation for litigation in its statement of the issues. While D&D’s reply brief contains 
some specific references to this claim, mention in a reply brief does not remedy the 
absence of issues in the initial appellate brief. See Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 
903 F.2d 186, 204-05 n. 29 (3d Cir. 1990) (“As a general matter, the courts of appeals 
will not consider arguments raised on appeal for the first time in a reply brief.”). This 
argument is abandoned, and we need not address it here. 
D. Count Eight: Breach of Contract  
 Count Eight of the complaint alleged contractual breaches by the Board. The 
District Court granted summary judgment to the Board on the ground that the claim had 
been assigned to the Surety. On appeal, D&D argues that the grant of summary judgment 
was inappropriate for several reasons, but does not challenge the District Court’s general 
reasoning. 
 First, D&D charges that the District Court improperly ignored relevant state law, 
specifically a series of cases under the New Jersey Trust Fund Act (“NJTFA”), N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2A:44-148. This line of argument is precluded. In granting summary judgment on 
Count Seven, the District Court specifically concluded that the NJTFA does not apply in 
this case because, under New Jersey law, no trust had been created. Because D&D has 
not appealed the District Court’s ruling on Count Seven, res judicata precludes this 
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argument. See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 
375, 396 n. 24 (3d. Cir. 1994). 
 Second, D&D argues that the District Court’s grant of summary judgment violated 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)(3)
 
because it did not allow time for the real party in 
interest to “ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3). 
Because this claim appears not to have been raised at the District Court, it is waived and 
not properly before us. See United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 212 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 Third, D&D argues that United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 
366 (1949), controls here and requires the conclusion that D&D was entitled to pursue 
the breach of contract claim in its own name. Aetna is inapplicable because it concerns an 
entirely dissimilar fact pattern. In that case, the Supreme Court held that where an insurer 
has only partially paid a claim and is therefore a partial subrogee to the insured, both the 
insured and the insurer may bring actions in their own names for the portions of the claim 
they respectively hold. See id. at 380-81. Here the District Court concluded that D&D’s 
rights were wholly, not partially, assigned to the Surety. D&D has not argued, nor even 
clearly suggested, that the ruling was in error for concluding that the contractual rights 
were wholly assigned. Aetna and cases following it thus provide no reason to question the 
District Court’s conclusion. 
 Fourth, D&D argues that its confirmed Reorganization Plan foreclosed the District 
Court’s conclusion that the Surety is the real party in interest. As the District Court 
specifically noted, this argument was raised for the first time in D&D’s motion to alter 
judgment, which was interpreted as a motion for reconsideration. Thus, despite the fact 
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that the Reorganization Plan was filed in 2004 and the Board first sought summary 
judgment because the Surety was the real party in interest in 2006, D&D did not raise this 
argument until 2012.  
 The Reorganization Plan argument is effectively an appeal of the denial of the 
motion for reconsideration. This motion can only be granted if the party seeking to alter 
the judgment can show “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the 
availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion for 
summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent 
manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 
677 (3d Cir. 1999). As the District Court concluded, there was neither an intervening 
change in law nor new evidence, meaning only a “clear error of law or fact” or the 
prevention of “manifest injustice” could justify granting the motion. Neither occurred 
here. D&D cannot use a motion for reconsideration to avoid the consequences of failing, 
without providing any explanation, to raise this argument in the six years this issue has 
been under litigation. See United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Such motions are granted for ‘compelling reasons,’ such as a change in the law which 
reveals that an earlier ruling was erroneous, not for addressing arguments that a party 
should have raised earlier.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Solis v. Current 
Dev. Corp., 557 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 2009))).  
 For all these reasons, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment 
for the defendants on Count Eight, nor did it err in denying the motion for 
reconsideration. 
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E. Counts Ten and Eleven: Tortious Interference and Defamation  
 Epstein cross-appeals on Count Ten, which charged him and other defendants with 
tortious interference with D&D’s business, and Count Eleven, which alleged that he and 
other defendants defamed D&D. The District Court declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over these state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice as to 
Epstein, Bovis, and Vitteta. Epstein contends that the District Court erred in doing so 
because both claims are barred by the New Jersey absolute litigation privilege for 
attorneys and the Board’s immunity ought to have been extended to him.  
  “[F]ederal appellate courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals only from ‘final 
decisions’ of the district courts. Accordingly, we normally do not entertain appeals from 
a district court order denying a motion for summary judgment because such orders do not 
put an end to the litigation.” Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(citation omitted). Epstein’s appeal is particularly unusual because these counts have 
been dismissed against him and D&D has not appealed their dismissal. He apparently 
seeks, through this cross-appeal, to preclude the bringing of these claims against him in 
state court through a grant of summary judgment in his favor. 
 Epstein argues that, because a dismissal without prejudice where the case cannot 
be reinstated in federal court is equivalent to a dismissal with prejudice, the decision is 
final and denial of summary judgment is reviewable. See Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley 
Mfg. Co., 460 F.3d 470, 477 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A] case dismissed without prejudice that 
cannot be reinstituted is in the same position as a case dismissed with prejudice in that 
both classes of cases have reached finality.”). This principle, however, is drawn from 
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cases assessing the finality of dismissals without prejudice as they relate to the finality of 
orders on other issues, not interlocutory orders on the same issue. See, e.g., Tiernan v. 
Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031 (3d Cir. 1991).  
 While the dismissals without prejudice of Counts Ten and Eleven are final, that 
does not render the decision to deny summary judgment directly reviewable. Reviewing 
the denial of summary judgment would impermissibly end run the District Court’s 
discretionary decision declining supplemental jurisdiction. By statute, a “district court[] 
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” when it “has dismissed 
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” precisely as occurred here. 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(c). Moreover, by Epstein’s own arguments, deciding these claims would require 
determining the effect of New Jersey’s absolute litigation privilege, which shields 
attorneys and parties from defamation liability based on statements made in judicial or 
quasi-judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 289 (N.J. 1995). 
The application of this privilege represents a significant and complex state law question 
that suggests an additional reason based on statute to decline supplemental jurisdiction. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the claim raises a novel or complex 
issue of State law[.]”).We review the decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
only for abuse of discretion. See Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 172 
(3d Cir. 2009). The District Court therefore did not abuse its discretion in declining to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.  
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*    *    *    *    * 
 In short, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on any count 
properly before us on appeal, nor did it abuse its discretion in dismissing without 
prejudice the remaining state law counts.
3
 We affirm its judgments.  
                                              
3
 Because they are now moot, we deny Epstein’s motion to supplement the appendix and 
D&D’s motion to combine its briefs. 
